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How does Europe Make Its Mind Up?
Connections, cliques, and compatibility between countries
in the Eurovision Song Contest
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a Physics Department, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 3PU, U.K. and
b Department of Engineering Science, Oxford University, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PJ, U.K.
(Dated: February 2, 2008)
We investigate the complex relationships between countries in the Eurovision Song Contest, by
recasting past voting data in terms of a dynamical network. Despite the British tendency to feel
distant from Europe, our analysis shows that the U.K. is remarkably compatible, or ‘in tune’, with
other European countries. Equally surprising is our finding that some other core countries, most
notably France, are significantly ‘out of tune’ with the rest of Europe. In addition, our analysis
enables us to confirm a widely-held belief that there are unofficial cliques of countries – however these
cliques are not always the expected ones, nor can their existence be explained solely on the grounds
of geographical proximity. The complexity in this system emerges via the group ‘self-assessment’
process, and in the absence of any central controller. One might therefore speculate that such
complexity is representative of many real-world situations in which groups of ‘agents’ establish their
own inter-relationships and hence ultimately decide their own fate. Possible examples include groups
of individuals, societies, political groups or even governments.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Jk, 64.60.Fr, 89.75.Hc
1. Introduction
Europe seems to exhibit all the characteristics of what
natural scientists call a Complex System [1]. It consists
of a network of many objects (i.e. countries) whose com-
plicated interactions depend both on geography and past
history. In short, these interactions are non-local in both
space and time. It is also a self-organized system, op-
erating through collective decision-making. While gov-
ernments and industries may be keen to strengthen ties
with their European counterparts, popular opinion seems
rife with prejudices and suspicions on the subject. Such
wariness is not too surprising: Europe has, after all, suc-
ceeded in giving birth to two World Wars within less than
one hundred years. Indeed, it is remarkable that a sin-
gle European constitution could soon emerge only sixty
years after the end of World War II. Such an emergent
phenomenon is itself a defining characteristic of a Com-
plex System [1].
Some countries are traditionally seen as ‘pro-
European’ while others are labelled ‘Euro-skeptic’. In
the case of the UK, for example, frequent media headlines
such as ‘Britain shuns EU info centres’ [2] arguably fuel
the country’s Euro-skeptic image. Referenda on the EU
Constitution are now taking place in individual countries
– for example, France will vote on 29 May 2005. However
it has been reported that most people are unaware of the
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precise content of the proposed constitution [3]. Given
this lack of factual knowledge, it seems likely that any
widespread Euro-skepticism among the population of a
given country A is merely reflecting A’s implicit distrust
of how countries B, C, D might act within a Europe-wide
system. Going further, it seems possible that any such
distrust is driven by a fear that B, C, D are fundamentally
incompatible with A. Hence a citizen of A perceiving such
an incompatibility with countries B, C, D, might there-
fore consider it a bad idea for A to permanently join up
with B, C, D. After all, people pay considerable attention
to such incompatibility issues when deciding on potential
partners in their private lives.
This discussion raises an interesting question: What
phenomenon could we measure in order to examine how
compatible the various European countries actually are?
Just as in the physical sciences, our ideal phenomenon
would be measurable in a transparent, quantifiable and
repeatable way, which implies repeating exactly the same
experiment in all countries under the same conditions and
over many years. However it should not be so economics-
driven that it ends up depending on commercial or politi-
cal issues. The required phenomenon must capture some
broad section of public sentiment and tastes, rather than
those of elite sectors. It should therefore be something
which is universally understandable and which automat-
ically engages the interest of the majority of the popula-
tion within each country. It should not depend directly
on individuals’ income, education, or language – instead,
it should capture something fundamental about the un-
derlying character and mood within a given country at
any given point in time. In short, we are looking for a
phenomenon whose measurable values might allow us to
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FIG. 1: The undirected, unweighted points network for the
Eurovision Song Contest in 1998. Each country awards points
to ten other countries, making the resulting network rather
densely connected. The links either exist (i.e. points were
awarded) or not (i.e. no points were awarded). There is
no weighting to reflect the specific number of points. The
countries with no links at all are the ones not present in the
competition in 1998.
deduce how ‘in tune’ different countries have been in the
past, are in the present, and might be in the future.
On 21 May 2005, the Eurovision Song Contest cele-
brates its 50th anniversary [4]. This 2005 contest will
probably attract the largest global television and radio
audience of the year – the combined television and ra-
dio audience figures in recent years have approached one
billion. Although the specific rules of the contest have
changed over the years, the basic format is the same:
Each participating country performs a song, and this
song is then awarded points by other countries. Irrespec-
tive of whether it contributes anything to the advance-
ment of music per se, the Eurovision Song Contest does
provide a remarkable and unique example of an annual
exchange of ‘goods’ and opinions between countries. Go-
ing further, it is arguably the only international forum in
which a given country can express its opinion about an-
other, free of any economic or governmental bias. Indeed
if we assume for the moment that a given song either
sounds ‘nice’ or not [5], then it should receive the same
order-of-magnitude of vote from all countries. Hence any
large differences in voting may be reflecting some deeper
sociological differences between countries. Assuming that
all countries have equal chances of producing intrinsi-
cally ‘nice’ songs over the timescale of a decade [5], then
any systematic bias which arises in the voting patterns of
country A toward countries B, C and/or D may be telling
us something about how compatible A is with B,C and/or
D. In this sense, the voting in the Eurovision might be re-
garded as the sociological equivalent of The Economist’s
Big Mac Index which compares the measured value (i.e.
cost) of a particular product within different countries
[6]. It has even been suggested that the concept of the
Eurovision Song Contest as a whole should be used as a
role-model for determining the overall composition of the
European Union [7].
In this paper, we use the framework of complex dy-
namical networks [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] in order to
analyze voting behaviour in the Eurovision Song Con-
test over space (i.e. between countries) and time (i.e.
between years). Although some previous studies of the
Eurovision Song Contest do exist [15, 16, 17, 18], our
study is unique for the following reasons: (a) We ana-
lyze the voting data from the point of view of a complex
evolving network. This enables us to uncover non-trivial,
non-linear patterns from a large amount of ‘noisy’ data.
(b) We look across multiple timescales, focusing on the
patterns which emerge between years. (c) We look across
all countries regardless of whether they won or not. (d)
We consider data over the recent period 1992-2003 inclu-
sive, during which the number of countries participating
is fairly constant. (e) Our analysis focuses on the points
given and received by all countries, rather than the final
outcome of the contest.
Some of our conclusions serve to confirm several
commonly-held beliefs about particular cliques of coun-
tries. However we also uncover some very surprising and
unexpected results. In contrast to some commonly-held
beliefs – in particular within the U.K. itself – the U.K. has
been consistently ‘in tune’ with the rest of Europe since
the early 1990s. Just as surprising is the fact that France,
for example, has been rather ‘out of tune’ with the rest of
Europe over the same period [19, 20]. [N.B. We will take
the term Europe to include all the countries participat-
ing in the Eurovision Song Contest. These include, for
example, Israel which has actually won the contest three
times. Other countries in the Middle East are apparently
also keen to join the contest sometime soon. Repeating
our study in a decade’s time could therefore provide some
even greater surprises.] Our analysis is built around the
framework of complex networks [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and
focuses only on the Eurovision Song Contest. However
we note that the analysis tools that we have used, and
those that we have introduced in the course of this work,
have more general applicability. This is because the Eu-
rovision Song Contest, in its most elementary form, is
just an example of a set of entities repeatedly exchang-
ing some goods. In another context, these goods could
equally well be ideas, opinions, money, supplies, food or
nutrients. In this sense, our analysis should also be ap-
plicable to time-evolving network systems in sociology,
biology, economics, business and even financial markets
3[21]. For example, the World Trade web in Ref. [12] takes
a similar form to the networks which we create for the
Eurovision Song Contest, but with countries exchanging
goods rather than points.
2. The Eurovision Song Contest and the data
The idea of creating a Eurovision Song Contest was
inspired by the popular Italian San Remo Festival. The
contest was originally titled The Eurovision Grand Prix,
and had only seven participants when it started in 1956.
Since then, the number of participants has risen steadily
and currently exceeds twenty [4]. The rules concerning
the procedure for voting and the language in which the
song must be sung, have also evolved over time. The
basic structure of the current scoring system has been
in place since 1975, whereby each voting country awards
ten other countries. Specifically, each voting country A
allocates the set of points {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12} to
the ten countries {B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I, J,K} that it con-
siders as ‘best’, where {B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I, J,K} are a
subset of the entire set S of competing countries. Coun-
tries are not allowed to vote for themselves. Although its
name refers to ‘Europe’, the Eurovision Song Contest reg-
ularly includes countries such as Israel, while other tra-
ditionally non-European countries are also petitioning to
enter. Regardless of one’s opinion about the Eurovision
Song Contest itself, the quantity of countries competing
and the number of television viewers across the globe sug-
gest that it is one of the world’s few truly international
events.
Given the way in which the points are awarded, and
the fact that they are recorded in a database on the or-
ganizers official website [4], one can easily construct a
network for each year of the contest by representing the
countries as nodes and the points exchanged as edges,
acting as connections between the nodes. This network
can either be directed (e.g. with directed edges drawn
from the country giving points to the country receiving
points), undirected (e.g. with undirected edges drawn
between countries if points are exchanged in either di-
rection), weighted (e.g. with edges drawn such that the
weight of an edge is equal to the number of points ex-
changed), or unweighted (e.g. with edges drawn such
that the actual number of points is ignored). Since each
country assigns points to ten other countries, the min-
imum degree that a country can have is ten and the
maximum degree is equal to the total number of other
countries in the competition in a particular year. An ex-
ample network is shown in Fig. 1. We emphasize that the
type of network analysis which we present in this paper
is not limited to the Eurovision Song Contest – the same
ideas can be applied to any type of network in which
the links between nodes represent exchanges. An inter-
esting aspect of a Eurovision Song Contest points-based
network, as compared to many other networks which are
typically studied in the literature, concerns its temporal
evolution. To understand this more clearly, consider a
standard collaboration network between scientists [11].
The scientists, represented by the nodes, are considered
connected if they have authored a paper together. At an
initial point in time, the network will exist with a number
of links between scientists. As time passes, more links will
appear as new collaborations are made and as new nodes
– corresponding to scientists publishing for the first time
– appear. The original connections will, however, persist.
Particular nodes will stop gaining new edges as scientists
cease publishing. By contrast to this continuous evo-
lution, the Eurovision network evolves discretely. The
network for each point in time is in essence an isolated
entity with limited correlation between years. In any
given year, links will exist between countries if they vote
for each other. The next year it is not necessary for any
of these links to remain since countries can change who
they assign points to. A further complication results from
the fact that the nodes change since different years may
contain different competitors. If a country connected by
an edge does not compete in consecutive years, then it
is impossible for a link to persist. The notable network
properties should come to light through a comparison of
these annual points-based networks. Between most pairs
of consecutive years, roughly eighty percent of the coun-
tries will be common and so it is interesting to investigate
which, if any, links persist. This leads to one of the main
avenues of investigation in the present paper.
The fact that there have been a number of changes to
the format of the Eurovision Song Contest over the years,
means that great care must be taken with the analysis
in order to deduce meaningful results regarding possi-
ble space-time patterns in voting behaviour. The key
changes which led us to the particular analysis which we
employ in this paper, are as follows: (i) In 1975, the
current scoring system was introduced in which coun-
tries award 1-8, 10 or 12 points. This implies that if
the weights of links are to be analyzed consistently, one
should only consider networks produced after 1975. (ii)
In 2004, a new format was devised with the competition
being split into a semi-final and a final. From 2004 on-
wards, all countries involved in the semi-final can vote in
the final, but only those that reach the final can receive
votes. The introduction of a semi-final in 2004 allows the
inward degree of a node to be significantly greater than
in previous years, thereby making the results from 2004
onwards structurally different and potentially far more
complicated. (iii) The number of countries entering the
competition between 1975 and 2003 fluctuated between
18 and 26. However, in 1992 this number stabilized at
around 23, with the number of countries competing in the
period 1992-2003 varying only slightly between 23 and
26. Given these three considerations, all the subsequent
analysis is therefore performed over networks produced
4in the stable period 1992-2003 inclusive [20]. It turns out
that thirty-six different countries compete in this period
1992-2003, but only twenty-six appear for seven years
or more. The investigation will therefore focus on these
twenty-six regular performers.
3. Analysis of the voting network and its com-
parison to a ‘random contest’
3.1 Background
The network analysis will be performed on two scales:
global and local. An initial investigation of the global
properties of the network will be undertaken, before shift-
ing to a local-scale consideration of the properties of in-
dividual nodes and edges. As will be shown, these two
types of analysis provide important but complementary
insights. When considering individual nodes, it is a rel-
atively straightforward matter to draw a picture of the
network with actual points and lines showing the inter-
actions of the particular country, and to answer specific
questions about network structure by examining this pic-
ture (see Fig. 2). However when considering the network
of all nodes for a particular year (as in Fig. 1) this ap-
proach is practically useless. It is therefore necessary to
use statistical properties, such as degree distributions,
that characterize the structure and behaviour of the net-
work.
In order to gain some perspective on the results ob-
tained from the empirical Eurovision data, it is necessary
to have something to compare them to. An insightful
comparison can be made by comparing it to the results
one would obtain if the Eurovision Song Contest were
a ‘random contest’. In order to simulate such a ‘ran-
dom contest’, we will assume that each song possesses
the same fundamental value (i.e. all songs are equally
‘nice’ [5]). Hence all songs will be equally attractive to
country A. The ‘random contest’ model also needs to as-
sume that a given country A possesses no biases in terms
of wanting to favour or penalize countries B,C,D, etc.
Hence the country of origin of a given song does not af-
fect the probability that country A will vote for it. Given
these two assumptions, country A will simply assign its
ten packets of points (i.e. 1-8,10,12) randomly among the
remaining countries. Any links between countries as a re-
sult of the points cast, will therefore exist independently
of each other. If there are N + 1 countries in a partic-
ular year including country A, then the probability that
country A votes for another country B in this ‘random
contest’ is given by pA→B = 10/N . The 10 in the numer-
ator results from the fact that each country can assign
points to ten other countries. We will use this ‘random
contest’ construction in order to generate surrogate data
which can then be compared to the actual Eurovision
data. This will then help us uncover any significant (i.e.
non-random) patterns in the actual Eurovision data.
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FIG. 2: An example showing the network as seen from the
point of view of a single node. This case shows the network
for Ireland in 1998. The numbers shown on each line indicate
the points awarded by, and to, Ireland. The arrowheads give
the direction of the link e.g. Ireland gave UK 5 points while
it received 8 from UK.
3.2 Clustering Coefficients
In most social networks [11] two nodes that are linked
to a third node have a higher probability of having a link
between them: acquaintances of a given person are more
likely to know each other. It is possible that the same
effect could be observed in the Eurovision network. If,
as is often hypothesized, there are a number of voting
‘cliques’ within the contest, then it is reasonable to as-
sume that the observed clustering coefficients [7] will be
greater than those arising from the ‘random contest’ sur-
rogate data. In short, if two countries both vote for a
third country, then there would be a higher probability
that they also vote for each other. The clustering coeffi-
cient C of a particular vertex is defined as the probability
that two neighbours of a given vertex are also neighbours
of one another. It then follows that C can be calculated
by evaluating the number of edges between the neigh-
bours of a given vertex ν, and dividing this quantity by
the combinatorial quantity d(ν)!/2!(d(ν)−2)! where d(ν)
is the degree of vertex ν. The denominator is just the
maximum possible number of edges between the neigh-
bours of ν. This implies that 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. Averaging
C over all vertices of a network yields the clustering co-
efficient of the network. Using this quantity, we have
calculated the clustering coefficients for each annual net-
work as in Fig. 1, between 1992 and 2003. Throughout
this paper, we have used the software program Pajek to
5help with the visual representation and analysis of our
results [22].
For the random contest (i.e. random network) the ex-
pected value of the clustering coefficient is equal to the
probability that two randomly selected nodes are con-
nected. This results from the fact that the links exist
independently and so the probability that two countries
vote for each other is not affected by the fact that they
both also vote for a common neighbor. To find the clus-
tering coefficient for this randomized version of the Eu-
rovision data (i.e. a random network) it is therefore nec-
essary to calculate the probability that a link exists be-
tween two countries. Assuming that there are N+1 par-
ticipating countries in a particular year, then the proba-
bility that country A votes for country B, or vice versa,
is given by:
pA→B = pB→A =
10
N
. (1)
The probability that there is a link between two countries
will then be:
plink = pA→B + pB→A − p(A→B)AND(B→A) (2)
which, given the independence of the links, can be re-
grouped to give
plink = 2pA→B − [pA→B]
2 (3)
and hence the clustering coefficient for the ‘random con-
test’ is given by
Crandom ≡ plink =
20(N − 5)
N2
. (4)
Table 1(a) and Fig. 3 show the observed and random
values of the clustering coefficients. As can be seen, the
observed clustering coefficients are always greater than
the random graph values. The Eurovision network con-
tains, on average, around twenty nodes and each node
must be connected to at least ten other nodes. This
small network size, combined with the high probability
of connection, means that one would always expect a
high clustering coefficient for a network of this nature.
However, the results do provide an indication that the
system is not random and that there are indeed some
voting ‘cliques’.
3.3 Degree Distribution
The degree distribution of the nodes provides further
evidence that the Eurovision network is not random. We
recall that the degree of a vertex is the number of edges
connected to that vertex. For the Eurovision network,
there are various possible definitions of the vertex degree
depending on whether in, out or in-and-out (i.e. recip-
rocal) connections are considered. In this section, the
degree of a vertex will be taken to mean the number
 
(a) 
Year 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992
N+1 26 24 23 24 23 25 25 23 23 25 25 23
C random 0.6400 0.6805 0.7025 0.6805 0.7025 0.6597 0.6597 0.7025 0.7025 0.6597 0.6597 0.7025
Cobserved 0.7164 0.7067 0.7635 0.7138 0.7785 0.7554 0.7120 0.7247 0.7408 0.6952 0.7387 0.7103  
 
 
(b) 
Giving Country
Receiving Country Pobserved Prandom Pobserved Prandom Pobserved Prandom Pobserved Prandom
Sweden - - 1.000 0.440 0.818 0.434 0.900 0.436
Denmark 0.875 0.440 - - 0.714 0.441 0.857 0.441
Norway 0.636 0.434 0.571 0.441 - - 0.800 0.436
Iceland 0.800 0.436 0.857 0.441 0.800 0.436 - -
Sweden Denmark Norway Iceland
 
 
 
(c) 
Giving Country
Receiving Country Pobserved Prandom Pobserved Prandom Pobserved Prandom Pobserved Prandom
UK - - 0.583 0.434 0.636 0.432 0.583 0.434
Spain 0.333 0.434 - - 0.273 0.432 0.583 0.434
Germany 0.636 0.432 0.636 0.432 - - 0.273 0.432
France 0.417 0.434 0.250 0.434 0.455 0.432 - -
UK Spain Germany France
 
 
 
(d) 
observed number of common links > random value UK Sweden Malta
observed number of common links < or ~ random value Spain France Croatia  
 
TABLE I: (a) The observed clustering coefficient Cobserved
and ‘random contest’ clustering coefficient Crandom, for 1992-
2003. There are N + 1 participating countries. (b) The ob-
served probability pobserved and the random contest probabil-
ity prandom, that the Nordic countries assign points to each
other. The observed probability pobserved is deduced from the
actual data. The countries giving points are shown along
the horizontal, while the countries receiving points are shown
down the vertical. (c) Same as in (b) but for the Big Four
group. (d) An approximate categorization, organized in terms
of the observed number of common links, of the six countries
that compete in the competition for eleven or twelve consec-
utive years between 1992 and 2003. The top line shows the
countries for which the observed number of common links is
typically greater than the random value (i.e. UK, Sweden
and Malta). The bottom line shows the countries for which
the observed number of common links is typically less than or
equal to the random value (i.e. France, Spain and Croatia).
of edges connected to that vertex. No distinction will be
made between inward, outward or reciprocal connections.
For any particular year, there are only around twenty
nodes and so it is difficult to draw any reliable conclu-
sions about the degree distribution. In order to increase
the size of the data set, the degree of nodes for all of the
years between 1992 and 2003 will be considered. Since
the number of nodes between years differs, it is neces-
sary to normalize the degree values so that the data be-
tween years is equivalent. This is done by dividing the
degree of each node by the total number of other coun-
tries appearing in that year. Instead of viewing a degree
distribution, one will then be looking at the distribution
of degree as a fraction of the maximum possible degree.
This quantity is universal across years and will produce
a distribution that is homologous with the degree distri-
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FIG. 3: Comparison of the observed clustering coefficient for
the actual Eurovision data for 1992-2003, and the correspond-
ing random graph result for the ‘random contest’ (see text for
description).
bution over all years. One can then define P (k/N) to be
the overall fraction of vertices in the networks that have
a normalized degree k/N . Equivalently, P (k/N) is the
probability that a vertex chosen uniformly and at ran-
dom, has a normalized degree equal to k/N . A plot of
P (k/N) can be produced by forming a histogram of the
normalized degree of vertices. This histogram is the nor-
malized degree distribution for the combined networks
and is equivalent to the actual degree distribution. For
the random network case, each edge is present or ab-
sent with equal probability. The resulting distribution
describing the probability of having a degree k, has the
usual binomial form [4] which depends on the average
probability that a connection exists in a particular year,
and the average number of countries appearing.
Figure 4 shows the normalized degree distribution for
the observed Eurovision Song Contest data. Far from
being a binomial distribution, the actual distribution is
right-skewed. The number of countries with a degree
close to the minimum value of ten is significantly greater
than the values expected for a random graph. An expla-
nation for this behaviour lies in the nature of the vertices.
If a country possesses a large number of reciprocal links
then, if the nature of the links is not considered, its de-
gree will be lower than if it had only in and out links.
The results suggest that a large number of reciprocal re-
lationships could exist between countries. This in turn
suggests a degree of cliquishness, since particular pairs of
countries will therefore be exchanging votes.
3.4 Cluster Analysis
The last two sub-sections have focused on global prop-
erties of the network. It is now instructive to perform
a local-scale analysis by considering the properties of in-
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FIG. 4: Histogram showing the observed normalized degree
distribution for the Eurovision Song Contest in the period
1992-2003, and (inset) the degree distribution which would
arise for the ‘random contest’ model. The x-axis is rescaled to
the range 0→ 1 in order to highlight the differences between
the two curves.
dividual nodes and edges. In particular, we will use the
notion of cluster analysis, whereby we will group together
countries which behave in a similar way and hence can
be regarded as being ‘close’.
As a measure of each country’s actions, we form a data
series consisting of the average number of points assigned
to each other entrant in the years in which they both com-
pete. The closeness of each pair of countries can then be
measured by comparing these data series using Pearson’s
correlation coefficient [23]. The Pearson coefficient takes
values ranging from −1 to +1. If two particular countries
assign exactly the same number of points to each partic-
ipating country, and thus possess identical data series,
their Pearson coefficient will be one. The Pearson coeffi-
cients are then rescaled to produce a ‘distance’ between
0 and 2 using the relationship that the rescaled distance
is equal to
√
[2(1− PC)] where PC is the Pearson coef-
ficient. The most closely related countries have rescaled
distances close to 0, while the least correlated countries
have distances close to 2. This data is then used to plot
a dendrogram which provides a visual aid for identifying
clusters.
Figure 5 shows the resulting dendrogram obtained by
consecutively linking the most correlated countries. For
example, Greece and Cyprus have the smallest rescaled
separation and so they are combined first. The next
smallest rescaled distance is between Denmark and Swe-
den and so they form the next cluster. Once two coun-
tries A and B have been combined into a cluster, they are
considered to be at the same distance from another coun-
try C, which is equal to the shorter of the distances AC
and BC. This construction is then generalized up for clus-
7ters with more than two countries. The distance between
any two clusters is the shortest distance between any two
countries in the two clusters. Progressively more coun-
tries and clusters are combined in this way, with some
countries combining with existing clusters, until all the
countries are united into a single cluster.
The dendrogram shows quite explicitly that the vot-
ing patterns of certain countries are highly correlated.
Greece and Cyprus have a very small rescaled distance
which demonstrates a very strong voting correlation.
This particular finding thereby confirms a long-held be-
lief among regular Eurovision viewers. There is a slightly
less correlated cluster that involves the Nordic countries,
Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and some-
what surprisingly, Estonia. Many other clusters also
arise: Bosnia and Turkey, Croatia and Malta, UK and
Ireland (who also show a correlation with the Nordic
clique), Belgium and the Netherlands and France and
Portugal. The high correlations between the way in
which countries assign points provides evidence in sup-
port of the theory that voting groups exist. Moreover
many of the observed correlations may be dominated by
only a few points in the data series which correspond to
points that are assigned to countries within a particular
voting clique.
Given the make-up of these groups, one may be
tempted to conjecture that the correlation between coun-
tries’ voting patterns is linked to their geographical close-
ness. If one considers that geographical closeness leads to
cultural closeness, then this conclusion would seem rea-
sonable since it is likely that neighbouring countries will
have similar cultural tastes and sociological ties, and will
therefore support each other’s songs. This conclusion is,
however, drawn into question by the existence of notable
exceptions to the rule. Consider, for example, the exclu-
sion of Spain from the group including France and Por-
tugal; the presence of Estonia in the quasi-Nordic clique;
the lack of correlation between Cyprus and Turkey. This
suggests that the observed voting similarities in the den-
dogram, have arisen for rather more subtle reasons (e.g.
a common, or uncommon, past history) as opposed to
simply being the result of geographical proximity.
3.5 Network-based Analysis of Clusters
The statistical analysis in the previous section consid-
ered the average number of points assigned by countries.
It is possible, however, that the results could have been
distorted by a participant allocating an uncharacteristi-
cally large number of points to a country in a particular
year. This leads us to pose the question as to what it ac-
tually means for two countries to be ‘close’. Is it most im-
portant to look at the similarities between how countries
allocate all of their points, or should we only consider
the number of points that particular countries assign to
each other? The previous section focused on the former,
but this also made it possible to conjecture on the latter.
In the remainder of this paper, we will focus on this ex-
change of points within smaller groups of countries and
in particular on the points exchanged by certain pairs
of participants. Indeed, the subsequent analyses will ne-
glect the weight of the links and will simply focus on the
existence, or not, of directed links between countries. We
will begin with the clusters determined in the previous
section.
Using the individual node networks (see Fig. 2) it is
simple to find the number of directed links that exist
between two countries and then to convert this into a
probability that a country will give points to another
country in a particular year. The observed probability
for the existence of a directed link pobserved is obtained
by dividing the number of years in which country A gives
points to country B, by the number of possible years
in which points can be given. It is again instructive to
compare these observed values with those derived for a
random graph corresponding to the ‘random contest’.
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FIG. 5: Dendrogram showing the voting clusters within the
Eurovision network. As the rescaled distance increases, the
clusters become less correlated. Greece and Cyprus, for ex-
ample, form the most correlated cluster.
Consider two countries A and B. The number of coun-
tries competing varies between years and consequently so
does the probability that country A assigns points to B in
a particular year. In order to calculate a single probabil-
ity that a country A will assign points to B, it is necessary
8to average over all the years in which both A and B com-
pete. The resulting values can then be compared to the
observed probabilities that a connection exists. We have
performed this analysis for all possible clusters, but will
only illustrate the results here for the four countries in
the Nordic cluster, and also the group consisting of the
‘Big Four’ countries UK, Spain, Germany and France.
This latter group is so named because they automatically
enter into the final each year as a result of the television
revenues which they generate.
Tables 1(b) and (c) show the observed and expected
probabilities for the two clusters. Table 1(b) provides fur-
ther supporting evidence that the Nordic group of coun-
tries form a voting clique. In all cases the observed prob-
abilities that countries within the cluster assign points
to other countries within the group, are higher than the
corresponding probabilities for a random contest. Indeed,
this discrepancy is rather marked in the majority of cases.
It is interesting to compare these results to the equiva-
lent values for the Big Four group. The cluster anal-
ysis performed earlier did not indicate that these Big
Four countries formed a cluster – however they provide a
useful comparison since they are present in nearly all of
the years 1992-2003. Table 1(c) shows that the observed
probabilities are often similar in magnitude to the ran-
dom probabilities and that there are roughly equal num-
bers of cases when the observed probabilities are above
or below the random value. This suggests that the Big
Four group act toward each other as if it were a ‘ran-
dom contest’, and hence their internal voting network
can be reasonably described as a random graph. These
results are consistent with the earlier finding of no clique
for the Big Four. In short, the voting patterns within
the Big Four group of countries is much closer to ran-
dom than for the Nordic clique. We have carried out
this same analysis for all of the other clusters suggested
by the cluster analysis. For each cluster, the probabili-
ties that countries within the cluster exchange votes, are
significantly higher than those predicted by the ‘random
contest’. These findings, while not shown explicitly here
because of space constraints, confirm the internal consis-
tency of our analysis and results so far.
3.6 Common Link Analysis
Section 3.5 compared the probabilities that countries
within particular groups vote for each other. This section
generalizes this analysis by measuring the persistence of
links between countries over time. In particular, we ex-
amine the number of consecutive years in which a link of
any variety exists between two nodes. For simplicity, we
only consider the presence or absence of a link between
participants and do not distinguish between in, out or
reciprocal links. This analysis allows us to identify pos-
sible ‘stable relationships’ between countries. After all,
if these were human relationships and we observed that
two people regularly exchanged gifts or acts of kindness
and affection, we would indeed suspect that these people
had a stable relationship and hence would consider them
‘compatible’.
For the purposes of discussion, consider first the case of
two countries: A and B. If we find that a given country A
either gives and/or receives points from another country
B each year over a number of years, and that this exceeds
that expected for a ‘random contest’, then we label A and
B as being compatible. Such compatibility implies that
irrespective of any changes in the external world, A and B
continue to identify with each other in consecutive years
and hence interchange points. Likewise, if A and B were
to change tastes radically, they would change in the same
way such that they still continue to interchange points.
Such compatibility will show up as a larger number of
common links than in the ‘random contest’. If instead
the reverse is true, and the number of common links over
time is smaller than the expected ‘random contest’ num-
ber, we would label A and B as ‘incompatible’. Carrying
out this common link analysis between country A and all
other countries B,C,D etc., will give us a measure of how
compatible country A is with the rest of Europe. Re-
peating this exercise for another country B, we can then
deduce which of the two countries appears more compat-
ible with the rest of Europe. In a similar way, we can also
deduce incompatibility between a given country and the
rest of Europe, in the case that the number of common
links is less than the ‘random contest’ result.
The observed numbers of common links over 2, 3, 4,
5, 6 and 7 consecutive year periods were found by an-
alyzing the individual node networks (i.e. Fig. 2) for
each of the countries which regularly participate. We
also investigated whether the observed results can be re-
produced, within standard errors, by the simple ‘random
contest’ model. When producing the corresponding ran-
dom graph data, it is essential to consider the countries
participating in a given year since non-participation sig-
nificantly limits the number of consecutive years over
which connections can persist. Of the twenty-six regu-
larly participating countries, only five compete in each
of the years 1992-2003. In order to produce results for
a corresponding random contest, a program was written
to randomly allocate points to countries: Each year was
represented by a receiving-country/giving-country ma-
trix with each non-participant assigned blank entries and
each participant assigned a unique random number. The
columns were then sorted by size. The rows in each col-
umn containing the ten highest numbers were assumed
to be the countries that had received points, and these
values were replaced by a ‘1’. All other cells were then
set to ‘0’. The number of common links over various con-
secutive year periods, was then determined by analyzing
these matrices year by year. In particular, common links
correspond to 1’s in equivalent positions on consecutive
matrices. This random voting process was performed 200
9times in order to mimic an ensemble average. Then the
average and standard deviation of the number of com-
mon links for each country, in a particular consecutive
year period, was calculated.
The occasional non-attendance of many of the
frequently-participating countries in the years between
1992 and 2003, means that while it is often possible to
get a reasonable number of results for these countries over
two or three consecutive years, for larger periods the re-
sults become sparse. Since we are primarily interested in
comparing the number of common links over all possible
periods (i.e. over multiple timescales) we will focus here
on those countries which were present for eleven or twelve
consecutive years. This includes the UK, France, Swe-
den, Spain, Malta and Croatia. We find that these coun-
tries can be broadly categorized into two groups: those
that have a number of common links that is nearly al-
ways greater than the random value and those where it
is nearly always less than or comparable to the random
value. The approximate categorization is as shown in
Table 1(d).
This common link analysis reveals a number of new
and surprising results. Figure 6 shows examples of the
observed and random results for the UK and France, over
two and seven consecutive year periods. We find that
there are several countries that have a number of com-
mon links – over varying periods of time – that are con-
sistently higher than the values predicted by the random
graph. These include the UK, Sweden, Malta, Ireland,
Germany, Cyprus and Estonia (when the existence of
common links is not prevented by their non-attendance).
The existence of countries with observed numbers of com-
mon links consistently larger than the ‘random contest’
result, again suggests a degree of cliquishness. These
countries seems to possess strong bonds with other com-
petitors, and these bonds provide regular channels for
the exchange of points. There are also a number of coun-
tries, including France, with a consistently low number of
common links. These results are particularly noteworthy
when considered in conjunction with the fact that there
are other countries which possess numbers of common
links commensurate with the random regime.
Most remarkably, it is the UK which seems to possess
the highest number of these strong bonds. This finding
is at odds with the popular notion (in particular within
the UK itself) that the UK is somehow adrift from Eu-
rope. Indeed, using the metaphor of the Song Contest
itself, this network analysis seems to suggest that the
UK is the country which is the most in tune with the
rest of Europe [19]. The countries at the opposite end of
the spectrum – France and, to a lesser degree, Spain –
possess observed numbers of common links that are con-
sistently lower than the ‘random contest’ value, although
they do fall within the one standard deviation error bars.
This is shown explicitly in Fig. 6 for France. Such a vot-
ing pattern could arise if a country has fixed views on
the type of song they wish to vote for, but the competi-
tors continually change the nature of their entries. This
country will then be forced to vary to whom they assign
points, resulting in seemingly random voting behaviour.
A surprising suggestion of this analysis is therefore that
France is out of tune with the rest of Europe, since the
links which it forms are largely incompatible with the
links which it receives back.
More generally, we note that this method of common
link analysis – which we believe to be new – should pro-
vide a useful tool for determining trends in a general class
of evolving networks that do not necessarily have many
similarities between consecutive time steps. It should,
for example, be directly applicable to determining per-
sistant relationships in the World Trade web [12] where
the available trading partners are continually changing.
We leave this interesting line of investigation for a future
paper.
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FIG. 6: The number of common links which are actually ob-
served, and those expected for a ‘random contest’. Countries
shown are UK (top) and France (bottom) for two (left) and
seven (right) consecutive-year periods. The blue points rep-
resent the observed values and the red points represent the
‘random contest’ values (shown with error bars of one stan-
dard deviation).
3.7 Reciprocal Links
The number of reciprocal links, in which two countries
both assign points to each other in a particular year, can
also be used as a measure of the cliquishness of countries.
In addition, a reciprocal link between two countries could
be reasonably interpreted as meaning that they each rec-
ognize something positive in the other’s song in that par-
ticular year. If a particular country possesses many such
links, it suggests that their song has a range of similar-
ities with other entries and thus that this country has
some deeper understanding of what the rest of Europe
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appreciates – it is again in tune with Europe.
We have determined the observed number of recipro-
cal links for each country through an analysis of the in-
dividual country-centred networks (i.e. Fig. 2). The
corresponding ‘random contest’ data were found as fol-
lows. Let there be N + 1 countries in a particular year.
The probability that a reciprocal link exists between two
countries is then given by (10/N)2. Hence the expected
number of reciprocal links which a country will have in
a given year is R = (100/N). Figures 7 and 8 show the
numbers of reciprocal links for the observed data and for
a random contest, for six regular attendees as a function
of time. The graphs tend to be noisier than the common-
links graphs of Fig. 6, since they are now responding di-
rectly to annual fluctuations. However they still manage
to show that each country has years in which it is above
or below the expected random number of reciprocal links.
It is also possible to identify countries that spend most
of their time above the random line, often with values
significantly greater than the random values, and those
that spend much of their time below the random line.
As can be seen, the UK, Sweden and Malta spend more
years above the line than below, and in many cases the
observed numbers of common links for these countries are
considerably larger than the expected random values. In
contrast, France and Spain have several years in which
they are significantly below the random line.
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FIG. 7: Comparison of the observed number of reciprocal
links, and the expected number of reciprocal links for a ‘ran-
dom contest’. Results are shown for UK, France and Sweden.
These observations are consistent with our earlier find-
ing that countries such as the UK, Sweden and Malta
are more in tune with the rest of Europe. As noted ear-
lier, it is particularly surprising that the UK falls within
this group since it is renowned for its apparent apathy
towards European unity. It is also worth noting that
many of the countries identified as having high numbers
of reciprocal links also possess large numbers of persistent
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FIG. 8: Same as Fig. 7, except that the comparison of recip-
rocal links is now shown for Croatia, Malta and Spain.
common links. Countries that fall into both of these cat-
egories include the UK, Sweden, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus
and Estonia. This may suggest that many of these persis-
tent common links are due to countries with which par-
ticular givers hold reciprocal relationships, where these
relationships may involve reciprocal behavior which is
non-local in time (i.e. stretches over many years). This
also supports the idea of voting cliques, with preferential
points allocation between groups of countries both within
a given year, and extending between years.
In Figure 9 we investigate such dynamical effects re-
lated to these reciprocal links. In particular, we look into
the possibility that there are reciprocal actions over time,
possibly even culminating in tit-for-tat type voting be-
haviour. We do this by considering two new variables for
each country. Consider country A: the variable GR (i.e.
Givet−1Receivet) is the number of countries for which A
voted in contest t − 1 and which then voted for A in
contest t. This attempts to capture the effect whereby
countries may reward A in a particular year for votes
which A gave to them in the previous year. Likewise, we
introduce a variable RG (i.e. Receivet−1Givet) which is
the number of countries which voted for A in contest t−1
and for which A voted in contest t.
The plots of GR and RG for each of the four countries
in Fig. 9, appear highly-correlated and may also have a
time-lag. The variable GR (i.e. Givet−1Receivet) seems
to lead in several cases. Malta seems to exhibit very
good judgement in terms of giving and receiving points
– in particular, it tends to give/receive with one group of
countries at exactly the same timestep as it receives/gives
with another. Spain seems to have a definite one-year lag
while the U.K. reconciles its give/receive and receive/give
groups over a two-year timescale.
11
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Year
St
an
da
rd
ise
d 
Re
wa
rd
Malta
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Year
St
an
da
rd
ise
d 
Re
wa
rd
Spain
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Year
St
an
da
rd
ise
d 
Re
wa
rd
Sweden
Givet−1Receivet
Receivet−1Givet
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Year
St
an
da
rd
ise
d 
Re
wa
rd
United Kingdom
FIG. 9: Reciprocity of giving and receiving over time, as mea-
sured using the variables GR (i.e. Givet−1Receivet) and RG
(i.e. Receivet−1Givet). See text for explanation). We have
normalized GR by the (unweighted) votes received in year t,
and RG by the votes received in year t − 1. This normal-
ization prevents fluctuations in the number of votes received
from dominating the dynamics of the resulting time series.
(Note that, as a result of the rules for awarding points, the
unweighted votes given out will remain strictly constant over
time).
4. Conclusions
We have presented a comprehensive study of a real-
world complex network, the ‘Eurovision points-exchange
network’ and have uncovered a number of new and sur-
prising trends within the data. As a side-product of this
investigation, we have also developed a set of simple yet
effective analysis tools which are applicable to finite net-
works which evolve over time. Indeed, the Eurovision
network is analogous to a range of other complex dynami-
cal networks involving the exchange of goods or opinions.
Consequently, both the particular study and the tools de-
veloped in this paper should be of wider interest to the
complex systems and complex networks community.
To tackle the problem of identifying trends within the
complex Eurovision exchange system, we investigated
both global and local network properties. We began
by calculating the clustering coefficients of the yearly
networks and the overall degree distribution. These re-
sults were found to differ significantly from the results
expected for an equivalent random network or ‘random
contest’ and thus provided the first suggestion that vot-
ing patterns do indeed exist. We then performed a cluster
analysis based on the similarities between the number of
points that countries allocated to other entrants. The
resulting dendrogram highlighted explicitly that voting
clusters exist, in particular demonstrating that Cyprus
and Greece assigned very similar numbers of points to
each of the other countries. The clusters identified in
this way were used as the basis for an analysis of individ-
ual nodes. The observed probabilities that connections
existed between countries in a cluster, were calculated
and found to be significantly greater than the equivalent
values for the random contest. By contrast, the observed
probabilities for countries in groups not identified as clus-
ters, were found to be comparable to the random con-
test results. This again supports the theory that voting
cliques exist, although the evidence suggests that they
are not based simply on geographical closeness.
Further evidence for clustering was provided by an
analysis of the numbers of reciprocal and common links.
This analysis helped identify those countries that seem to
be most ‘in tune’ with the rest of Europe. Most surpris-
ingly, this study has led to the suggestion that the UK is
closely united with the rest of Europe, while France, for
example, is not.
Although this study concerns, and is strictly limited
to, the data emerging from a music competition, we will
speculate for the moment on its possible wider context.
It is clear that we have uncovered non-trivial and non-
random behaviour in the voting dynamics. Implicit in
our analysis is the assumption that all songs are, on the
face of it, equally ‘nice’ – in other words, they are of
equal musical quality and hence any differences in pref-
erences expressed by a given country A are completely
related to the question of ‘taste’. Underlying such ‘na-
tional taste’ is the idea that a country may collectively
have some reasonably well-defined preferences – just like
an individual socio-economic agent within the research
literature. Indeed, we believe that the spatio-temporal
complexity that we have observed in the interactions of
our N countries, is not unlike that expected within a
group of N interacting human beings – and in particu-
lar, a group of N heterogeneous agents. For this reason,
it will be interesting to continue monitoring the Eurovi-
sion Song Contest well into the future, in order to mon-
itor possible changes as other ‘agents’ (i.e. countries)
enter the arena (i.e. Eurovision Song Contest). It is
clear from the rules of the contest, that the complexity
which we observe throughout this study arises from the
process of group ‘self-assessment’ and that this process,
while driven by well-defined local rules, has no central
controller. One might therefore speculate that the com-
plexity that we have observed, is representative of many
real-world situations in which groups of ‘agents’ establish
their own-interrelationships and hence ultimately decide
their own fate. Possible examples include groups of indi-
viduals, societies, political groups or even governments.
Finally, we acknowledge that there are an infinite num-
ber of possible network measures that we could have ap-
plied to the present data-set. We also acknowledge that
these other network measures might conceivably have led
to somewhat different conclusions, although just how dif-
ferent would remain to be seen. However, we would like
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to emphasize that the present study – which by defini-
tion has had to be finite and limited – was carried out in
an unbiased way in terms of the choice of network tools
employed. We chose our set of tools a priori, without
having analyzed the details of the data, and this led us
to the surprising findings and conclusions which we have
reported here. It remains to be seen whether voting be-
haviour in future Eurovision Song Contests will remain
consistent with the findings of this paper. That is part of
the interest, to see how things may evolve over time – and
exactly how that happens will depend on how individual
countries make their minds up.
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